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Is It Time for a Restatement of 
Statutory Interpretation?* 
Lawrence M. Solan† 
INTRODUCTION 
This article suggests that a book that no one has asked for 
should not be written. Well, almost. In 2003, appellate lawyer 
Gary O’Connor wrote an article suggesting that the American 
Law Institute (ALI) compile a Restatement (First) of Statutory 
Interpretation.1 O’Connor’s article has been cited in the law 
review literature, and downloaded from the Social Science 
Research Network more than 1,500 times. This is a good time to 
look once again at O’Connor’s suggestion because some recent 
developments in the field of statutory interpretation suggest a 
growing convergence, notwithstanding embattlement on a few 
well-studied issues. 
Three developments lead to this reason for optimism. 
First is the excellent work of Abbe Gluck, who has argued 
persuasively that there is quite a bit of consensus on how to go 
about statutory interpretation, especially in the state courts, where 
most of the statutory interpretation occurs.2 The acrimonious 
debates between Justice Antonin Scalia and his detractors over the 
use of legislative history in statutory interpretation sometimes 
obscure the significant amount of agreement that does exist. 
Second, there is the work of Scalia himself. He and Bryan Garner 
have published a book, Reading Law, that reads like a traditional 
 
 * No. 
 † Don Forchelli Professor of Law, and Director, Center for the Study of Law, 
Language and Cognition, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful to Abbe Gluck and 
Jeffrey Pojanowski for comments on an earlier draft, Anita Bernstein for suggestions 
and support, and to participants in the 2013 summer research workshop at Brooklyn 
Law School for valuable suggestions. This work was supported by a dean’s summer 
stipend from Brooklyn Law School. 
 1 Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 333 (2004). 
 2 Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L. J. 1750 (2010). 
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legal treatise, bold face and all.3 Is there enough coherence for 
it to form the basis of a description of standard methodology in 
statutory interpretation? The authors surely intend it to be so. 
And third, some scholars in substantial disagreement with 
Scalia and his textualist methods have observed that despite 
appearances, most everyone is in agreement about what to 
consider in interpreting statutes. Moreover, the most dramatic 
area of disagreement—the use of legislative history as evidence 
of legislative intent—rarely plays anything resembling a 
dispositive role in determining cases. It would be difficult to 
identify a single judge who routinely uses legislative history to 
trump a statute’s plain language. 
This article describes these positions and in each case 
argues that there is less consensus than meets the eye. It 
concludes that absent actual agreement on both method and 
results in a large body of cases, a Restatement of Statutory 
Interpretation would enable judges to create the illusion of 
certainty in a world in which they have more discretion than 
they are comfortable acknowledging. The article further 
comments on why other Restatements—the Restatement of 
Contracts in particular—can better avoid some of these pitfalls. 
I. CONSENSUS ABOUT CONSENSUS IN STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
Notwithstanding vibrant disagreement about a few issues, 
especially the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation,4 
the literature shows more and more acknowledgement of what 
various positions have in common. Judge Frank Easterbrook came 
close to acknowledging this growing consensus about consensus in 
his foreword to Scalia and Garner’s book: “Professional norms—
including norms about interpretive method—produce much more 
consensus than would be expected if judges’ decisions mirrored the 
disagreement in legislative bodies or political debates.”5 
 
 3 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012). 
 4 Compare, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW (1998) (anti-history), with STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005) (pro-history). 
 5 Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 
xxiv. The consensus is not complete, as Easterbrook acknowledges. He goes on to 
suggest that there would be more consensus if Scalia and Garner’s methods were “more 
widely followed.” Id. Of course, consensus would also increase if Scalia and Garner’s 
methods were more widely rejected in favor of another method. 
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William Eskridge’s review of Scalia and Garner begins 
with a similar observation: 
[Scalia’s] judicial opinions, speeches, articles, and books have generated 
great debates, which have (ironically) revealed a substantial consensus 
about the ground rules for statutory interpretation. Thus, virtually all 
theorists and judges are “textualists,” in the sense that all consider the 
text the starting point for statutory interpretation and follow statutory 
plain meaning if the text is clear. However, Justice Scalia’s new book, 
coauthored with linguist Bryan Garner, reveals that virtually all 
theorists and judges are also “purposivists,” in the sense that all believe 
that statutory interpretation ought to advance statutory purposes, so 
long as such interpretations do not impose on words a meaning they will 
not bear. And virtually all theorists and judges insist that statutory 
context is important in discerning the meaning of statutory texts.6 
I have made similar points in my own writing,7 as has 
Jonathan Molot.8 
The strongest evidence of consensus in statutory 
interpretation comes from Abbe Gluck’s study of state court 
interpretive decisions.9 With respect to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, she argues, contrary to the writers mentioned 
above, that there is no consensus about interpretive 
methodology.10 Nor is there agreement on the methods of 
interpretation from state to state. Nonetheless, in a careful study of 
five states, Gluck shows serious efforts from both courts and 
legislatures to create hierarchies of interpretive instruments 
designed to bring uniformity to the state’s interpretive 
methodology. Her analysis suggests that it is possible for a 
common-law based legal system to take statutory interpretation 
seriously, and to develop methods that will be generally followed. 
Sometimes these methods come from the legislature, sometimes 
from the courts. Sometimes there is tension between the two 
branches. Nonetheless, in example after example, Gluck shows 
that once a methodology has been established, it is typically 
followed by the courts. Even those judges who do not agree with it 
nonetheless reluctantly apply the methodology. 
 
 6 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 
(reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3), 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013). 
 7 LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR 
INTERPRETATION 51 (2010) (“Gone largely unnoticed in the battles between these 
camps during the past quarter century is the fact that both sides in the debate agree 
upon almost everything when it comes to statutory interpretation.”). 
 8 Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
36-48 (2006). 
 9 Gluck, supra note 2. 
 10 Id. at 1765-66. 
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To take one example, in 2004 the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin articulated a methodology of modified textualism,11 
which remains good precedent today. Basically, courts are to 
consider the language of the statute in context, and not to look 
to extrinsic sources absent a finding of ambiguity. Once 
ambiguity is discovered, however, it is fair game for courts to 
look to legislative history and other extrinsic sources of 
information about the statute’s purpose and the legislature’s 
intent. Only after failing to resolve the ambiguity at that stage 
do substantive canons of construction come into play, largely as 
tie-breakers. 
Scalia and Garner are themselves more combative in 
their tone than the remarks of Easterbrook or Eskridge would 
suggest. They conceptualize their volume in terms very much 
in the tradition of the American Law Institute’s Restatements of 
the law. They say: “We believe that our effort is the first modern 
attempt, certainly in a century, to collect and arrange only the 
valid canons (perhaps a third of the possible candidates) and to 
show how and why they apply to proper legal interpretation.”12 To 
be sure, the book unfolds as a description and defense of Scalia’s 
brand of textualism, and an out-and-out rejection of competing 
approaches, such as purposivism and consequentialism. 
Nonetheless, the book contains a great number of 
generalizations that would be considered acceptable generally, 
even by the authors’ opponents. Among them is that courts 
typically turn first to a statute’s language in determining its 
application;13 that purpose nonetheless matters in resolving 
vagueness and ambiguity;14 that vagueness is far more 
commonplace than ambiguity as the source of interpretive 
problems;15 that stare decisis applies to statutory decisions;16 and 
that even easy cases require interpretation, although the 
interpretation is so obvious that the interpretive process is often 
not apparent.17 Moreover, while Scalia and Garner would give 
principles such as the rule of lenity18 and the avoidance of 
constitutional problems19 higher priority than they would 
 
 11 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County (In re Criminal 
Complaint), 681 N.W.2d 110, 122-27 (Wis. 2004). 
 12 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 9 (footnote omitted). 
 13 Id. at 56-58. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 31-33. 
 16 Id. at 5. 
 17 Id. at 53-55. 
 18 Id. at 296-302. 
 19 Id. at 247-51. 
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purpose, their tool box is not very different from that of the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, putting aside the eschewal of 
legislative history as a legitimate source of information for 
statutory interpretation. 
 Thus, while there is not total consensus about statutory 
interpretation, there appear to be mainstream views, shared 
even among people who disagree with one another on some 
basic issues. These views put language first, then consider the 
statute’s purpose, apply stare decisis, engage various canons of 
construction, and so on. 
I do not mean to trivialize the differences, such as the 
use of legislative history and the point in the analysis in which 
purpose comes into play. However, the passion concerning 
debate over legislative history, to my mind, exceeds its doctrinal 
importance.20 It is easy enough to find cases in which legislative 
history is used to lend additional support to a position justified in 
part on other grounds, especially linguistic grounds. It is difficult, 
in contrast, to find cases in which a court uses legislative history 
to justify a reading that the language of the statute does not 
permit. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,21 decided in 
1892, is often brought out as the poster child for such practices.22 
But that case is now more than 120 years old. Should it not by now 
have spawned at least a single poster grandchild? There appears to 
be enough in common, even among those who disagree, to take 
seriously the possible benefits of restating the law as it exists now, 
with forthright acknowledgement of those areas of disagreement. 
That is what Gary O’Connor suggested a decade ago. Let us look at 
the arguments in support of such a project. 
 
 20 SOLAN, supra note 7, chapter 3. 
 21 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (relying in part on legislative history in 
determining that a statute prohibiting the payment of transportation into the United 
States of a person performing “labor or service of any kind” does not apply to a church’s 
paying the expenses of its new clergyman moving from London to New York). 
 22 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 89 (2006). I do not agree with the position that 
Holy Trinity Church illustrates the triumph of history over language. Rather, I have 
argued that the case is better explained as a classic application of the ordinary 
meaning canon. See SOLAN, supra note 7 at 54-55.  
738 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:2 
II. THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF A UNIFIED APPROACH TO 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
A. Statutory Interpretation by Treatise 
Gary O’Connor’s 2002 article advocating for a Restatement 
of Statutory Interpretation23 observes that common law principles 
of statutory interpretation are not likely to yield consistent results 
even within the same court, are less likely to yield consistent 
results across courts within a jurisdiction, and are still less even 
likely to do so across different court systems in different 
jurisdictions.24 
O’Connor proposes that the American Law Institute 
publish a Restatement as a solution to all of the chaos in 
statutory interpretation. His main argument that such a 
project would likely be successful is by analogy with the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which contains many sections 
dealing with the interpretation of authoritative legal texts. These 
include issues such as the relevance of the intent of the parties,25 
the use of extrinsic evidence to determine intent,26 and a 
hierarchy of evidentiary proof.27 The issues are not precisely 
the same as those facing statutory interpreters, but the 
analogous provisions are surely pertinent.28 
Quoting a suggestion made by Peter Strauss, O’Connor 
wisely suggests that the new Restatement not be based on the 
most contentious of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
but rather on an assessment of ordinary practice.29 As for the 
question of legislative history, which has remained a matter of 
strong disagreement among scholars and judges alike, O’Connor 
 
 23 O’Connor, supra note 1, at 334. 
 24 Id. at 336. 
 25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981). 
 26 Id. at § 213. 
 27 Id. at §§ 219–22. 
 28 For comparison of the jurisprudence of statutory and contractual 
interpretation, see Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and 
its Implication for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195 (1998). 
 29 O’Connor, supra note 1 at 354. Interpretive practices in contexts other 
than the U.S. Supreme Court have recently generated attention in the academic 
literature. For discussion of statutory interpretation in state courts, see Gluck, supra 
note 2; Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479 
(2013); Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and 
Unwritten Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory 
Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011). 
For discussion of statutory decisions in the lower federal courts, see Aaron-Andrew P. 
Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogenity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 433 (2012); Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts 
of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317 (2005).  
2014] RESTATEMENT OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 739 
 
presents several alternative approaches, the most promising of 
which is to acknowledge the disagreement and to write the 
relevant Restatement sections in the alternative.30 
Along similar lines, but with an entirely different 
institutional perspective, Nicholas Rosenkranz has proposed 
unifying the principles of statutory interpretation through 
legislation that would enable the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Statutory Interpretation, much along the lines of other federal 
rules, such as the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.31 
Rosenkranz has more to say about why this is the right 
institutional distribution than he does about what such a set of 
laws should actually say, although he does suggest some 
especially contentious areas that would benefit from a uniform 
set of rules of interpretation. 
O’Connor and Rosenkranz both recognize that common 
law reasoning is not likely to bring uniformity to statutory 
interpretation. There are too many judges saying too many things, 
and too much room for judges to make choices in their decision 
making that lead to inconsistent results. O’Connor, though, 
presents a number of reasons for preferring a Restatement to a set 
of federal rules, many of which have persuasive force. The most 
practical one is perhaps the most powerful: adoption of a set of 
federal rules requires the cooperation of all three branches of 
government, making it unlikely to happen absent the perception of 
some compelling reason.32 It is not likely that both houses of 
Congress perceive such a compelling reason. Moreover, a set of 
federal rules is just that: federal. A Restatement, in contrast, 
may be used by state and federal courts alike.33 
Enter Scalia and Garner, who refer to their book as a 
treatise. And a treatise it is. The book is an effort to restate 
what is important in the realm of statutory interpretation for 
lawyers, judges, and academics alike. For the past century, the 
treatise on statutory interpretation that has been recognized as 
most complete is J.G. Sutherland’s 1891 treatise, Statutes and 
Statutory Construction,34 the seventh edition of which was edited 
 
 30 O’Connor, supra note 1, at 355. 
 31 Nicholas Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 2085 (2002). 
 32 O’Connor, supra note 1, at 356-57. 
 33 Id. at 356. 
 34 J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION INCLUDING A 
DISCUSSION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS, CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO THE 
FORMS OF LEGISLATION AND TO LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE: TOGETHER WITH AN EXPOSITION 
AT LENGTH OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION AND COGNATE TOPICS (1891). 
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by Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer in 2007.35 In 
saying this, I mean no disrespect for the many books published on 
statutory interpretation over the years.36 But most, like 
Eskridge’s Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,37 have as their 
principal goal the defense of a particular perspective on the 
subject, necessarily omitting a great deal of doctrine that is 
important to practitioners and judges, but not central to the 
debates in which the particular book engages. 
Scalia and Garner have broader aspirations for their book, 
which is replete with bold-faced print and examples illustrating 
each of the 57 doctrines they espouse and the 13 they reject. Their 
goal is to provide the first new reference book in a century for those 
engaged in statutory interpretation. What influence their book will 
have remains to be seen. What is clear now, however, is that 
Reading Law contains a great many controversial claims scattered 
among those about which there is relative consensus, as the 
perceptive review by Eskridge38 demonstrates. 
B. What Should a Restatement Say? 
I do not wish to devote much space here to what a 
Restatement of Statutory Interpretation should include. Suffice it 
to say that there is enough consensus about the interpretation of 
laws to make it clear that there would be plenty to say that is not 
enormously controversial. An ALI committee would be 
responsible for structuring the project. That task should be 
doable. For example, O’Connor suggests a table of contents for the 
Restatement, and Scalia and Garner have an actual table of 
contents, which organizes their discussion of the issues. It is 
instructive to compare the two in order to see how much they 
have in common. 
 
 35 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION (7th ed. 2010). For discussion of the history of this treatise, including 
interesting biographical information about Sutherland, see O’Connor, supra note 1, at 340-44. 
 36 For an example of a recent excellent book that refers to much of the 
relevant literature, see KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW 
INTERPRETATION (2013). For a very nice summary of the various canons and principles 
intended for students but useful to others, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2006). 
 37 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994). 
My own book, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES, supra note 7, is limited in this same way: 
It discusses those documents relevant to its main arguments, especially the centrality 
of intent in statutory interpretation. Taking views quite at odds with those of Eskridge 
is VERMEULE, supra note 22. It, too, focuses on those doctrines germane to the book’s 
chief argument, which is relatively better competence of the administrative state to 
make interpretative decisions now delegated to judges. 
 38 See Eskridge, supra note 6. 
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O’Connor’s proposed Restatement would begin with 
language-internal principles, shift to external considerations, 
and subsequently present principles applicable to different kinds 
of legislation.39 Scalia and Garner, in contrast, organize their 
canons around principles applicable to all texts, and principles 
applicable to government prescriptions. The former consist largely 
of grammatical canons, contextual canons, and what they call 
basic principles, the most important of which is principle of the 
primacy of language. The latter consist largely of substantive 
canons relating to government action, such as the rule of 
constitutional avoidance and the rule of lenity, and canons that 
deal with such questions as retroactivity, private rights of 
action, and repeal by implication. 
O’Connor’s proposal is organized somewhat less 
conceptually than Scalia and Garner’s book, but the substantial 
overlap in coverage is obvious. If one compares O’Connor’s 
suggested list of topics with the table of contents in Scalia and 
Garner’s book, one will not find a sense of controversy over what 
should be covered in a treatise that attempts to treat statutory 
interpretation thoroughly. 
With this level of agreement about what should be 
covered, and with Scalia and Garner taking positions that are 
sufficiently controversial to render their book inappropriate as 
a substitute for a Restatement whose content is vetted and 
debated by people with different perspectives, it would seem 
that a Restatement of Statutory Interpretation is a good idea. 
And to that extent, it is a good idea. At the very least it can 
serve to separate the great deal that is agreed upon from the 
 
 39 O’Connor, supra note 1, at 354: 
Chapter I: Intrinsic or Grammatical Aids to Interpretation 
Chapter II: Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation 
Chapter III: Interpretive Presumptions—General 
Chapter IV: Interpretation of Repealing Acts, Amending Acts, and Acts 
Incorporating Other Statutes 
Chapter V: Interpretation of Consolidating and Codifying Acts 
Chapter VI: Interpretation of Particular Kinds of Statutes 
 § 601 Appeals, Statutes Authorizing  
Statutes authorizing appeals are to be strictly construed. 
 § 602 Deportation, Statutes Authorizing  
Ambiguities in deportation statutes are to be construed in 
favor of aliens. 
 § 603 Penal Statutes  
Punitive sanctions are not to be applied if there is ambiguity 
as to underlying criminal liability or penalty. 
 § 604 Tax Statutes  
Exemptions from federal taxation are to be construed 
narrowly. 
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controversial issues that remain in contention, articulating 
both sides in the latter case.  
III. WHERE A RESTATEMENT CANNOT HELP AND MAY DO 
HARM 
In this section, I express concerns about creating a 
Restatement. In evaluating my arguments, one should keep in 
mind the legitimate purposes that such a project might serve. 
My doubts about creating a Restatement summarizing the 
world of intellectual harmony in the arena of statutory 
interpretation described above is not whether there is enough 
agreement to summarize; it is not even whether the 
disagreements are so passionate that there can be no resolution 
at the margins. Rather, the real problem with supporting an 
effort to restate this field is that someone might actually read it. 
The field is so politicized that an authoritative, black letter text 
is likely to be used by judges as yet more cover for the positions 
they wish to take in close cases. 
Here I present three basic reasons for why so many 
legal actors, even those with different political orientations, can 
agree on how to interpret statutes generally, but not agree on the 
resolution of particular cases. First, and most importantly, people 
can agree on the principles of interpretation, but disagree on what 
weight to give each consideration in a particular case. There is no 
agreed-upon set of principles setting such priorities, although 
Cass Sunstein attempted to develop a hierarchy many years ago,40 
Einer Elhauge41 has done so more recently, and both Gluck42 and 
Eskridge43 address the issue to at least some extent. Second, as a 
number of researchers (including Scalia and Garner) have noted, 
most statutory cases are about vagueness—the accordion-like 
nature of concepts that can be construed at various levels of 
generality and abstraction (“use a firearm” for example). It is very 
difficult to come up with a predictive rule or set of rules that will 
predict results in such cases. Third, one can interpret language 
either in terms of the outer boundaries of a statutory term, or 
in terms of ordinary usage. Judges vacillate between the two 
 
 40 See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: 
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990). 
 41 See generally EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO 
INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION (2008). 
 42 Gluck, supra note 2 devotes much of her article to describing the competing 
priorities that various states assign to the various interpretive methods. 
 43 See Eskridge, supra note 6 (commenting on the various roles that 
language, purpose and canons should play under a reasonable interpretive regime). 
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approaches, and there is no reason to expect them to stop. I 
deal initially with the first of these issues, and then with the 
second two in combination. 
A. Not Knowing When to Talk about What  
More than 60 years ago, Karl Llewellyn observed that 
judges appear to pick and choose among canons of construction, 
often selecting a canon that leads to one result, instead of 
selecting an equally available canon that would have led to the 
opposite result.44 His “thrust and parry” table of canons45 is still 
widely cited today.46 For the most part, the selective use of 
canons should not be troubling when there is general 
uniformity in the manner of selection. Judge Posner likens 
their use to the use of proverbs. Generally, no one gets upset at 
the fact that we use them to tell people to hurry up (“a stitch in 
time saves nine”) and to slow down (“haste makes waste”).47 We 
take them for granted as rules of thumb that should be used 
sensibly in context. Taken that way, they work pretty well. But 
if you are trying to get on a New York subway car and the 
doors close right in front of you, “haste makes waste” really is 
the wrong thing for someone to say to you. 
Posner may go a little too far in his analogy because 
while canons are in a sense proverbial, they are also robed with 
authority: They typically come from the analysis presented by 
appellate courts as justification for their interpretation of a 
statute whose application is in dispute. Yet their sheer number 
makes it difficult to take the canons’ authority seriously. Thus, 
when Gluck speaks of “methodological stare decisis,” she refers 
more to fairly broad decisions about the relative roles of a 
statute’s language, exploration into its purpose using legislative 
history and other extrinsic information, and the canons taken as a 
whole, than to the obligation to choose one canon over another.48 
Scalia and Garner get it right in their third canon of 
construction, which they list among the “fundamental principles” 
of statutory interpretation: “No canon of construction is absolute. 
 
 44 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. 
REV. 395 (1950). 
 45 Id. at 401-06. 
 46 The article was cited in law reviews 20 times in 2012, and 25 times in 2013. As of 
that date, Lexis lists 595 citations to the article, dating back to 1982. Obviously, the 32 years 
prior to Lexis’s coverage period contains many more citations.  
 47 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 280 (1993). 
 48 Gluck, supra note 2, at 1772. 
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Each may be overcome by differing principles that point in other 
directions.”49 To them, this problem can be solved, at least in large 
part by the principle that language almost always trumps any 
extrinsic evidence of legislative meaning, and the principle that 
the purpose of a statute is relevant, but is to be derived only 
from the language of the statute itself. 
It is here that things begin to collapse, more or less in 
the way the legal realists said they would. Take the case of 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great 
Oregon,50 discussed by Scalia and Garner,51 and a focal point of 
Eskridge’s review of that book.52 In that case, the U.S. 
Department of the Interior, pursuant to authority granted under 
the Endangered Species Act, had issued regulations to protect 
endangered species, including the northern spotted owl. The 
statute made it illegal to “take” an endangered species,53 and 
included the word “harm” in the definition of “take.”54 The 
regulation then defined “harm” as including habitat modification 
“where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly 
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, 
feeding, or sheltering.”55 In everyday English, damage to an 
animal’s habitat is a far cry from “taking” the animal, which 
generally means killing the animal. The conflicting opinions—
Stevens for the majority upholding the regulation, Scalia for the 
dissent—read like the last round of a boxing match in which 
the two fighters have remained standing, but have thrown and 
absorbed all of the punches that their strength and endurance 
would allow. 
The majority relied on, among other things, the Chevron 
doctrine (giving deference to the agency to whom regulatory 
authority has been delegated),56 the statutory definition,57 the 
purpose of the statute (stated in the text of the law itself),58 the 
rule against surplusage,59 the legislative history,60 the language 
 
 49 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 59. 
 50 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 
(1995). 
 51 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 300-02. 
 52 Eskridge, supra note 6, at 536-38. 
 53 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1994). 
 54 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994). 
 55 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994). 
 56 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 866 (1984). 
 57 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 
687, 703 (1995). 
 58 Id. at 697-98. 
 59 Id. at 698. 
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of the legislated definitions,61 and the structure of the statute as 
reflected in the role of various provisions.62 The dissent relied on 
dictionary definitions,63 the enactment history (the order in 
which various provisions were introduced),64 the consequences to 
loggers of upholding the regulation,65 the structure of the statute 
as reflected in the role of various provisions, and grammatical 
canons of construction, especially noscitur a sociis.66 
Putting aside the use of legislative history, there is 
really little or no controversy about the legitimacy of the 
canons used by both sides. Yet the opinions, taken together, look 
like an advertisement for Llewellyn’s position, now about two-
thirds of a century old. One can reduce much of the disagreement 
to politics. Scalia begins his dissent by lamenting the plight of the 
logger; Stevens focuses on the congressional policy of saving 
endangered species. If deference to the interpretation of 
statutes by regulatory agencies were every judge’s priority, this 
would have been an easy case for the majority position. Even if 
the agency did not adopt the best interpretation of the statutory 
language, it certainly is a possible interpretation, to which 
deference would be due if deference were the most important 
interpretive value. The dissent, in contrast, offered some 
compelling arguments about the structure of the statute, 
including the fact that the statute specifically offers remedies 
that do not include the banning of logging. 
But it is not good enough to claim that this case is really 
about taking Chevron seriously. Let us say that a Restatement 
adopts Adrian Vermeule’s proposal to increase deference to 
agencies and decrease the discretion of judges more or less across 
the board.67 Empirical research shows that judges apply the 
doctrine of deference to administrative agencies differentially, 
depending upon whether the current president is of the same 
party that was in power when the judge was appointed to the 
bench. It is not that the system is corrupt to the core. Rather, 
judges, like the rest of us, have a tendency to give the benefit of 
the doubt to positions that they find attractive. On the margins, 
                                                                                                                                     
 60 Id. at 705-06. 
 61 Id. at 697-98 n.10. 
 62 Id. at 702-03. 
 63 Id. at 717 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 64 Id. at 729-31. 
 65 Id. at 714. 
 66 Id. at 720-21 (a canon calling for the meanings of words in a list to be 
construed as consistent with its neighboring words). 
 67 VERMEULE, supra note 22. 
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then, it matters who the judges are in such cases.68 The game is 
an easy one to play: declare an agency action (typically a 
regulation) unambiguously outside the scope of the statute 
empowering the agency to regulate in order to strike it down, or 
declare the empowering statute ambiguous or murky with respect 
to the agency action in order to uphold the agency. In Babbitt, 
Scalia never came out and said that the statutory language 
unambiguously precluded the agency action. But he came as 
close as he could to saying it by focusing on the everyday uses 
of the statutory language, notwithstanding congressional 
definitions broadening the scope of the terms. 
If Babbitt illustrates the application of the Chevron 
doctrine to uphold a regulation in the teeth of instrumentalist 
arguments for why the regulation was a bad idea, MCI v. AT&T69 
illustrates the application of the Chevron doctrine to strike down a 
regulation in the teeth of fairly good linguistic arguments in 
support of its validity. A provision of the Federal Communications 
Act requires telephone companies to publish all of their tariffs 
regularly.70 Because there were so many tariffs, and because they 
changed regularly to meet changing market conditions, this 
requirement was sufficiently burdensome that it could potentially 
act as a market barrier, making it more difficult for new entrants 
in the telecommunications industry to succeed. The statute also 
authorizes the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to 
“modify” this requirement.71 The FCC did just that, by exempting 
small carriers from the publication requirement. 
AT&T cried foul, claiming that the authority to “modify” 
the requirement did not include the authority to eliminate it for 
a group of carriers. A divided Supreme Court agreed with AT&T, 
and struck down the regulation as exceeding the agency’s 
authority. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia relied heavily 
on dictionary definitions of “modify” that supported his position 
that only small changes can be considered modifications. A 
 
 68 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron 
to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1104 (2008); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do 
Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 823, 826 (2006). For an empirical study outside the realm of the Chevron doctrine 
expressing a similar account, see James Brudney & Cory Ditslear, The Warp and Woof 
of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and 
Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231 (2009). 
 69 MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
 70 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2013). 
 71 Id. 203(b)(2). 
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dictionary definition that tended to support a broader reading, 
and relied upon by the dissent, was dismissed as “peculiar.”72 
The dictionary analysis did not do a very good job here. 
It is entirely possible to make relatively minor changes to a 
rule by eliminating its application to a small group to whom it 
would otherwise apply. A high school, for example, may require 
all students to eat lunch on campus, and then “modify” the 
requirement to permit graduating seniors to eat lunch off 
campus in their last month of school. 
Looking at these two cases together, one might ask: 
What is the relative strength of the Chevron doctrine and the 
choice of dictionaries used to determine the clarity of an agency’s 
regulatory authority? And what is the relationship between the 
value of keeping coherent a statute’s overall structure and 
deferring to an agency’s interpretation of a law? And how much 
should the economic consequences of a regulation play into the 
analysis of what is reasonable? And where does the purpose of 
a statute enter the analysis? 
Assuming that all of these considerations—among the 
others brought out by the various opinions in these cases—are 
legitimate ones, and I believe they are, it will never be possible 
to come up with a hierarchy that will rank all of the 
considerations in such a way as to have the ranking apply across 
a broad range of cases. This is because various factors can be 
stronger or weaker from case to case and judges require enough 
flexibility to take this into account. For example, the strong 
statement of statutory purpose in the Endangered Species Act,73 
while not an important factor to the dissenters, played a significant 
role in the majority opinion, reinforcing its conclusion that the 
language of the statute permitted such regulation under a 
reasonable interpretation.74 Had the statutory language been the 
same, but the stated purpose of the law was to limit interference 
with the development of the logging industry, the relative 
weightings may well have been different for some of the justices. 
This point is a serious one. For if there can never be 
consensus about the weight to assign various factors in deciding 
a case, then there can be no consensus to restate in a 
Restatement. The consensus discussed earlier is at a more 
general level of analysis: language trumps purpose, the rule of 
 
 72 MCI, 512 U.S. at 227. 
 73 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012). 
 74 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 
687, 698 (1995). 
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lenity should be applied one way or another, interpretations that 
make the code more coherent are to be preferred over 
interpretations that make the code less coherent, and so on. But 
when it comes to the details, it all falls apart.75 As Babbitt 
illustrates, the discussion never even reaches enough coherence 
to call it disagreement. Rather, the disagreement is over ad hoc 
weightings of factors whose relevance in legal analysis is 
largely undisputed, but whose role in an individual case can be 
likened to a hockey puck in a face-off at center ice.  
B. Why Determining Word Meaning is Too Hard to Restate 
It is not unusual to speak of a statute’s meaning, but 
determining meaning is not really the task at hand in statutory 
interpretation. What judges do in deciding statutory cases is to 
make a judgment about whether a law applies to the facts of a 
case and, if so, how it applies. Characterizing the meaning of a 
term may help in performing that task, but it is not necessary in 
principle. A judge deciding whether driving under the influence 
qualifies as a “violent felony” for purposes of interpreting a law 
that defines that term as a criminal act that includes physical 
force or “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another”76 need not define the 
word “otherwise” to reach a decision.77 Moreover, it is not the 
least bit easy to define even the most ordinary-seeming words. 
The reader might try to define the verb “paint” as a thought 
experiment and note the difficulties encountered.78 
Most cases of word meaning are about borderline 
situations, or vagueness.79 Certainly most of the classic cases in 
American legisprudence are cases of vagueness: Should an 
airplane count as a vehicle with respect to applying a statute 
 
 75  Others observe similarly. See Richard Ekins, The Nature of Legislative 
Intent 260 (2012). 
 76 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(2)(B) (2013). 
 77 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). Actually, the Supreme Court 
did rely, at least in small part, on a dictionary definition of “otherwise” in that case, but 
could have shed the reference without any serious compromise in its reasoning. Id. at 
144. For discussion, see James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The 
Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries, in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 483, 553-54 (2013).  
 78 This fact has been observed by philosophers of language. For a seminal 
work, see J.A. Fodor et al., Against Definitions, 8 COGNITION 263, 339 (1980). 
 79 This observation is important, but not new. See SOLAN, supra note 7, ch. 3. 
For that matter, Scalia and Garner make this point. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 
3, at 31-33. 
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enacted in 1919?80 Does a minister perform labor?81 Does the 
ordinary meaning of “use a firearm” include trading an unloaded 
machine gun for some drugs?82 
How should courts resolve these cases? By definition, 
the language is not dispositive. In all of these cases, it is possible 
to answer the question affirmatively, but there is reason to 
question whether the enacting legislature would have wished 
the statute to apply to such outlying situations. The problem 
has been observed since Aristotle: 
[E]very law is laid down in general terms, while there are matters 
about which it is impossible to speak correctly in general terms. 
Where it is necessary to speak in general terms but impossible to do 
so correctly, the legislator lays down that which holds good for the 
majority of cases, being quite aware that it does not hold good for all. 
The law, indeed, is none the less correctly laid down because of this 
defect; for the defect lies not in the law, nor in the lawgiver, but in 
the nature of the subject matter, being necessarily involved in the 
very conditions of human action.83 
But Aristotle’s solution is easier to state in general terms than 
it is to apply in particular cases. How can one determine which 
situations fit within the law’s contemplation, and which do not? 
The U.S. Supreme Court makes significant use of the 
ordinary meaning canon, which says that the courts should 
assume the legislature to have expected statutory terms to be 
construed in their ordinary sense.84 However, while courts 
sometimes apply this canon, at other times they do not, opting 
instead for a broader reading, based on their assessment of how 
well the ordinary meaning captures the intent of the legislature. 
Smith v. United States is such an example. The Court decided 
that using a gun as an item of barter counts as “using a firearm” 
for statutory purposes, albeit an unusual use of a firearm. 
An even stronger illustration is Chisom v. Roemer,85 a 
1991 case interpreting a section of the Voting Rights Act. The 
act required states to hold elections in such a way as not to 
afford protected classes less opportunity “to elect representatives 
 
 80 McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1931). 
 81 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458 (1892). 
 82 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 225 (1993). 
 83 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 5, ch. 10 (F. H. Peters trans., 5th 
ed. 1893) (c. 384 B.C.E.). For discussion, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, 
PROBABILITIES AND STEREOTYPES 42-48 (2003). 
 84 See Dolan v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006); Small v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 385, 406 (2005); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. at 242 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 85 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1991). 
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of their choice.”86 In this case, citizens complained that a state’s 
electoral scheme for electing judges made it more difficult to 
elect African American judges.87 Both the history and purpose of 
the statute strongly suggest that the legislature had no reason 
to limit this rule’s application to prototypical representatives, 
that is, legislators. On the contrary, it would almost appear to be 
a cruel rejection of the legislation’s goals for a court to determine 
that Congress sanctioned the racist election of local judges 
when it enacted the statute. 
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissenting opinion, 
however, the ordinary meaning of “representative” surely does not 
include judges.88 We do not think of judges as representatives. So 
the question was whether the court should stretch the meaning of 
“representative” beyond its ordinary meaning to include judges, 
and that is exactly what the Court did. Such interpretive 
dilemmas illustrate more than a conflict among canons of the sort 
Llewellyn presented. These conflicts reflect serious disagreement 
over the nature of word meaning itself, making consistency in 
decision making especially difficult to achieve. 
Even when there is general agreement over the method 
of finding the meaning of a statute, there is no agreed-upon 
way of finding that meaning in individual cases. An excellent 
example comes forward in Judge Posner’s review of Scalia and 
Garner’s book89 (minus the vitriol that ensued). Scalia and 
Garner praise a state court judge in Massachusetts for 
concluding that a shopping center’s leasing space for a Mexican 
restaurant serving tacos, burritos, and quesadillas would not 
violate its obligations to Panera under a lease that, which 
prohibited the landlord from leasing space to a business, 10% of 
whose projected revenue would consist of the sale of sandwiches.90 
Scalia and Garner praise the judge not for the result of the case, 
but for having decided the case by looking up “sandwich” in a 
dictionary and accepting its definition as “two thin pieces of 
bread, usually buttered, with a thin layer (as of meat, cheese, 
or savory mixture) spread between them.”91 
 
 86 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2011). 
 87 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 384-85. 
 88 Id. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 89 Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/
scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism. 
 90 White City Shopping Ctr., LP v. PR Rest., LLC, 21 Mass. L. Rptr. 565 
(Mass. Supp. 2006). 
 91 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2011 (1993) (defining 
“sandwich”). 
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This is a very limited notion of sandwich, though. As 
Posner asks, what about a club sandwich, or an open-faced 
sandwich? But there are even bigger problems. Are wraps 
sandwiches under the lease? If so, then it will be hard to 
distinguish between a wrap and a burrito, since the former is 
derivative of the latter.92 The two are visually very similar, 
suggesting that their main difference may be how our culture 
perceives them, rather than physical characteristics subject to 
definition.93 If the court were to limit itself to the dictionary 
definition, then submarine sandwich shops would also be 
permitted. Much more can be said about what constitutes a 
sandwich at the margins, but even these few examples suggest 
that it is a less simple feat than one might think. And once one 
gets that far, one must decide whether the parties intended to 
restrict only prototypical sandwiches, or sandwiches as broadly 
construed. Among the arguments set forth by the judge was the 
fact that there were Mexican restaurants near the shopping 
center, suggesting that if the tenant wished to require their 
preclusion, it would have said so. Does this mean that context 
trumps ordinary meaning, that ordinary meaning is hard to 
discover, or that it is not a simple matter to decide whether to 
commit to the prototype or to the broad interpretation of 
statutory language, absent contextual information? I believe it 
illustrates all three of these contingencies.94 
For similar reasons, even where a uniform methodology 
has been established, there may be little consensus about how to 
apply it in individual cases. Thus, in Wisconsin, where a 
hierarchy of considerations has been judicially established,95 it is 
not clear how much this consensus can bring about agreement 
among judges as to the proper result in an individual litigation. 
The Wisconsin court leaves a lot to be decided on a case-by-case 
basis, a point Chief Justice Abrahamson made in her concurring 
opinion.96 For instance, it is not clear how uncertain meaning 
 
 92 The Wikipedia entry for “sandwich wrap” recites this history. sandwich wrap, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandwich_wrap (last updated Nov. 7, 2013). 
 93 See Marjorie Florestal, Is a Burrito a Sandwich? Exploring Race, Class, 
and Culture in Contracts, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 32 (2008) (perceptively asking, 
“Does a Burrito Have a Race?”). For a good summary of the arguments in the case and 
their broader interpretive ramifications, see CHRISTOPHER HUTTON, WORD MEANING 
AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 91-94 (forthcoming 2014). 
 94 For further discussion of the selection between ordinary and definitional 
meaning, see SOLAN, supra note 7, ch. 3; see also Brian C. Slocum, Linguistics and 
‘Ordinary Meaning’ Determinations, 33 STATUTE L. REV. 39 (2012). 
 95  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County (In re Criminal 
Complaint), 681 N.W.2d 110, 122-27 (Wis. 2004), discussed supra note 11. 
 96 Id. at 127-28 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
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must be before a judge declares a statute ambiguous, triggering 
further inquiry. Although the court defines ambiguity, it proposes 
an objective test without indicating which facts should feed the 
analysis. The court says: 
It is not enough that there is a disagreement about the statutory 
meaning; the test for ambiguity examines the language of the 
statute “to determine whether ‘well-informed persons should 
have become confused,’ that is, whether the statutory . . . language 
reasonably gives rise to different meanings.”97 
Thus, judges, using their own intuitions about meaning, 
will have to decide what makes an interpretation a reasonable 
one. This is not always an impossible task. However, individual 
judges, as speakers of English, have their own sense of a term’s 
meaning. Without knowing the extent to which people reasonably 
disagree with one another on the application of a word in 
borderline cases—such as the ones litigated at the appellate court 
level—there will likely not be consensus on whether a statutory 
term is ambiguous or not, thus triggering disagreement about 
which tools are appropriate to use in an individual case.98 
Gluck recognizes that there is a difference between 
agreeing on methodology and agreeing on the results of that 
methodology’s application in individual cases. Scalia and Garner 
likewise emphasize that recognition of an appropriate 
interpretive method is not sufficient to render interpretive 
decisions easy ones. This, they correctly point out, stems from the 
fact that so many statutory adjudications involve the resolution of 
borderline cases, which are by their very nature close calls. 
CONCLUSION: SHOULD WE GIVE IT A TRY? 
Where does all of this leave us? It is both possible and 
feasible to assemble a Restatement that recites most of what 
statutory interpreters do every day in cases that are largely not 
controversial. This would accomplish quite a bit. It would in 
essence, be a more complete version of what Scalia and Garner 
have attempted—i.e., cataloging and illustrating legitimate 
canons—and a manageable replacement of Sutherland, based 
 
 97 Id. at 124 (citations omitted) (majority opinion). 
 98 For discussion of this pervasive problem, see Lawrence M. Solan, Terri 
Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1268 (2008); Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts 
and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859 (2004). 
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on a more modern taxonomy of issues, along the lines that 
O’Connor suggested.99 
But there are problems, and the problems are magnified 
by the prestige of the ALI Restatements. For one thing, while 
there is general consensus about the basic elements of statutory 
interpretation (putting aside the nagging battles over the use of 
legislative history), there is no consensus about the hierarchy of 
the various categories. Although there is consensus about such 
things as the role of the canons of interpretation as a general 
matter, there is no generally accepted practice for preferring one 
canon over another. Furthermore, so much of statutory 
interpretation focuses on the meaning of statutory language. 
There is no consensus about how to find that meaning, with 
judges applying competing methods without even acknowledging 
the problem. Making matters more difficult, there is little reason 
for a Restatement to insist upon one meaning over another. 
Sometimes, a broad interpretation of words seems appropriate, 
at other times a narrow one. These are not the only problems 
that drafters of a new Restatement will face, but they are 
daunting ones. 
What is both true and troubling about the prospect of a 
Restatement of Statutory Interpretation is this defense of the 
project by Gary O’Connor: 
The Restatement process may be able to provide the “time-honored 
acceptance” that scholarly work by individuals may not be able to 
provide. Restatements are familiar to almost all attorneys. In many 
areas of law, such as torts and especially contracts, they have a high 
degree of acceptance with courts. A Restatement could serve as a 
bridge between the scholarly and judicial worlds in this area and 
provide a means for scholarly canons to gain judicial acceptance.100 
Bridging the gap between scholarship and practice is 
obviously a laudable goal. But there are many ways to build a 
bridge. The bridge that provides methodology to a judge wishing 
to do things “right” and that actually enables that judge to judge 
according to a widely accepted set of jurisprudential values is one 
that both judges and practitioners will welcome enthusiastically. 
In contrast, the bridge that gives judges exercising discretion in 
accordance with their own values the opportunity to take further 
cover in authoritative material may not be a bridge to nowhere, 
but it is not a bridge worth building. A new Restatement will by 
its very nature build both kinds of bridges, and will have no 
 
 99 See O’Connor, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 100 Id. at 359. 
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mechanism for forcing any given judge to traverse one bridge or 
the other in any given case. 
My sense, then, is that a Restatement is feasible, and 
would have value. But it is also likely to become yet another 
vehicle for supporting one or another argument in controversial 
cases. This reluctance is bolstered by the fact that similar 
problems occur with the interpretive sections of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, although the problems are not as severe. 
For example, Section 213 contains the parol evidence rule, which 
says that prior agreements that are inconsistent with an 
integrated written agreement are inoperative.101 The well-known 
problem with this rule is how to determine whether the prior 
agreement is inconsistent with the current one. The more closely 
one examines contextual information the less work is being 
accomplished by the parol evidence rule itself. Thus, some states 
employ a “hard parol evidence rule” by which little or no 
contextual analysis is permitted if the language appears plain 
on its face, while others employ a “soft parol evidence rule” by 
which courts conduct an examination of the language in 
context as a preliminary matter when the parol evidence rule is 
adduced.102 
Other interpretive sections do not enjoy the wide 
acceptance and prestige that the Restatement generally carries. 
For example, Section 211 excludes from standardized 
agreements terms that are outside the reasonable expectations 
of the non-drafting party.103 This section is not widely applied by 
courts104 outside the interpretation of insurance policies, and 
even there the results are mixed.105 Similarly, Section 201(3)106 
states that when the parties do not understand the language of a 
contract the same way, and neither party has taken advantage 
of the other’s different understanding, then there is no contract. 
This has been the result in some celebrated cases, which make 
 
 101 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981). 
 102 For discussion of these doctrinal choices, see Russell Korobkin, The Borat 
Problem in Negotiation: Fraud, Assent, and the Behavioral Law and Economics of Standard 
Form Contracts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 51 (2013); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the 
Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 
533, 536 (1998). 
 103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981). 
 104 See, e.g., Rory v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Mich. 2005). 
 105 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the 
Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 
CONN. INS. L.J. 181 (1998). 
 106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(3) (1981). 
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their way into every contracts casebook.107 But the courts are 
generally reluctant to hold that there is no contract when both 
parties believe that there is one. 
On the other hand, there are some doctrines of contract 
law that are far better-established than are their counterparts 
in the realm of statutory interpretation.108 Chief among them is 
Section 203, which dictates a hierarchy of extrinsic evidence.109 
This is exactly what is missing in the canons of statutory 
interpretation: a ranking of various canons. The difference, no 
doubt, lies in the fact that there are comparatively few players 
in the contract formation process, and a limit to the kinds of 
historical information likely to be relevant: the history between 
the parties, the usage in the trade, and so on. Even in this well-
established realm of contract law, however, recent empirical 
scholarship by Lisa Bernstein suggests that the evidence 
presented to courts is sufficiently uneven to undermine 
consistent decision making.110 
There is consensus significant enough to motivate serious 
consideration of a Restatement of Statutory Interpretation. 
However, there are obstacles to creating universal procedures in 
statutory interpretation, and even greater obstacles to creating 
procedures that are both universal and reliable in producing the 
same result regardless of who applies them. How can there be so 
much agreement about how to go about an activity and so little 
 
 107 See Frigaliment Imp. Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864). 
 108 Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its 
Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195 (1998). 
 109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203. Standards of Preference in 
Interpretation. In the interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, the 
following standards of preference are generally applicable: 
(a) an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning 
to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part 
unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect; 
(b) express terms are given greater weight than course of performance, course 
of dealing, and usage of trade, course of performance is given greater weight 
than course of dealing or usage of trade, and course of dealing is given 
greater weight than usage of trade; 
(c) specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general 
language; 
(d) separately negotiated or added terms are given greater weight than 
standardized terms or other terms not separately negotiated. 
 110 Lisa Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts: The Flawed Conceptual and 
Evidentiary Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy (Univ. of Chicago Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 452), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366533. 
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agreement about what the process should produce? My own sense 
is that statutory interpretation becomes a self-conscious 
enterprise only in hard cases. The major doctrines of contract, 
torts, property, and so many of the restated areas of law, in 
contrast, are about all cases. Contract interpretation, however, is 
very much like statutory interpretation, albeit with fewer 
institutional issues arising. That is why the interpretive portions 
of the Restatement of Contracts are so problematic, in the context 
of a project that has, for decades, been rightly seen as a 
resounding success. That is also why a useful Restatement of 
Statutory Interpretation would be a difficult task to accomplish. 
 
